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GIFTS AND PROMISES. By John P. Dawson. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press. 1980. Pp. ix and 240.
Shael Herman*
In an individualistic, market-oriented society, generous impulses
mystify and confound. Find a generous gesture and one wonders
about the donor's ulterior motives. Psychologists tell us that even
when we prefer others over ourselves we seek our own gratification.
Legal doctrines effectuating generous impulses also mystify. Scratch
a good Samaritan and we find an "altruistic intermeddler."' Assum-
ing no one does anything freely, a first-year contracts course
teaches that even an offer must be supported by consideration to be
enforceable,' though a hawk, a robe, a hairpin, or a false recital of
"one dollar paid in hand" might serve as consideration. It also
teaches that charitable subscriptions are enforceable if they comport
with important social policies;' and, if they do, then the compensa-
tion for such promises might take the hazy form of the donee's
reliance or the donor's anticipated pleasure. Equally troublesome is
the notion that the donor's gratuitous cause renders enforceable a
promise of a liberality. The animus donandi does not hold up well
under rigorous analysis.4 So it is a rare treat to see such analysis at-
tempted, especially when the effort is sustained for a whole book.
Professor Dawson's new book, an expanded version of his Storrs
Lectures at Yale in 1978, offers rich and provocative comparative
perspectives upon the treatment of gratuitous promises. His focus
can be summarized in a short question familiar to first year contract
*Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University. Grateful acknowledgment is
made to Professor Cynthia Samuel, Tulane Law School, for her constructive criticism
of an early version of this review.
1. On the attitude of the common law regarding the duty to render aid in an
emergency, see Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56
U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 631 (1952). On compensation for rescuers see Dawson, Negotiorum
Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1961).
2. See J. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 211-12 (1980).
3. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246
N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927). A comparable doctrine was established in Louisiana
nearly 150 years ago. See Louisiana College v. Keller, 10 La. 164 (1836).
4. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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students: "Can a fully capable person make a binding promise to
another to give or do something for nothing?','" The answer, given at
once, is also short:
For countries within the sphere of influence of the English com-
mon law the standard answer would be no, almost never. For
the more civilized countries of western Europe the standard
answer would be yes, since they have never suffered from the
blight that afflicts countries adhering to the English common
law-the requirement of bargain consideration.'
Though the focus of this book appears assiduously narrow, it has
kaleidoscopic potential. Professor Dawson moves over fascinating
terrain including the treatment of gifts in the law of classical Rome,
France, Germany, England and the United States. By focusing
serially upon the problem of gratuitousness in several systems, he
uncovers unsuspected links between the enforcement of gratuitous
promises, the origins of forced heirship, the role of the notary, mixed
gifts, and bargain consideration. For readers of Oracles of the Law,7
Professor Dawson's monumental work on judicial lawmaking, the
landscape of Gifts and Promises is familiar. In his latest book, the
oracles speak; what they tell us is as fascinating as his earlier doc-
trinal work, Unjust Enrichment! Professor Dawson's purpose, as he
tells us in the preface, is to discover whether we have something to
learn from the treatment of gratuitous promises by certain foreign
legal systems. Is there greater readiness in France and Germany
than in the United States to enforce promises for which there is to
be no exchange? If so, do France and Germany have reasons for
enforcement absent in the United States? Do we enforce promises
for reasons not accepted in France and Germany? In the process of
answering these questions, he teaches us much about legal method
under codes. Because Louisiana is the only state with a continental-
style "Romanesque" code, the book can prompt Louisiana attorneys
to introspection. For them, an added purpose of this study is to
discover if they have anything to learn from their own experience.
If so, the question becomes whether they have anything to teach.
Like Oracles of the Law, Professor Dawson's new study begins
with a chapter on the legacy of Roman law. This chapter requires
close reading: its main themes recur as variations in succeeding
chapters. According to Professor Dawson, "the promise of gifts as a
distinct contract type, fully enforceable in undisguised form was not
5. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Id.
7. J. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).
8. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1951).
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recognized until very late near the end of the Roman law as an
operative system."' Early on, however, a Roman donor could
disguise a gift within a standard mancipatio; if he was not yet ready
to convey the object, he might bind himself by a stipulatio, the all-
purpose formality of Roman law. Roman law featured several
unremunerated transactions, which are familiar institutions of the
Louisiana Civil Code: the deposit (depositum),0 loan for use (com-
modatum),"1 loan for consumption (mutuum),"2 mandate,"3 and
suretyship.' These gratuitous contracts, all commonly used by the
Romans, were enforced because Romans who occupied high social
positions could not countenance being caught taking money for their
services:
[A]cceptance of payment for personal services was demeaning,
even sordid .... The admired posture was that of the generous
friend, ready to give aid or render service but finding abhorrent
any notion of an agreed, enforceable reward. If the enterprise
undertaken because of friendship, mutual respect, or personal
honor was left incomplete or was carelessly managed, the com-
pulsion to adhere to high standards of conduct was felt strongly
enough so that it was appropriate for courts to intervene and ad-
minister correctives.15
Though an American lawyer might be hardpressed to find links be-
tween family stability and contracts, the Romans found them and
made them durable enough to recur in modern German and French
law. The legitimacy and even nobility of unremunerated transactions
were confirmed by an important Roman practice: a flat prohibition
against gifts between husband and wife because "marital harmony
must not appear to be 'procured at a price.' "1 This prohibition ap-
plied to transfers of goods, not services. In other words, a transfer,
to fall into a prohibited class, had permanently to diminish one
spouse's patrimony and correspondingly to increase the other's.
Within the narrow range specified by the rule, however, the prohibi-
tion was so strictly enforced that if the donee spouse exchanged the
donated asset for another, the donor could trace it and claim owner-
ship of the substituted asset.17
9. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 7.
10. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2926-81.
11. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2893-2909.
12. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2910-22.
13. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985-3034.
14. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 3035-70.
15. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 13.
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id. at 17.
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Rescripts in Justinian confirm that all kinds of gifts, so long as
they did not run afoul of this interspousal prohibition, might be
valid. By the twelfth century, when intensive study of Roman law
was resumed in Italy, medieval jurists discovered that the array of
contract types, both remunerated and unremunerated, left many
gaps. There were consensual transactions that did not fit a par-
ticular recipe or formula. Some glossators called these misfits "nude
pacts" and searched for doctrines to clothe them. Tests for defining
nudity in pacts tended to coalesce with tests defining absence of
cause. Even in medieval scholarship, however, the idea of cause,
already denatured and sapped of meaning, did not help to mark off
promises of gift as especially vulnerable. Though gifts were valid,
doctrinal foundations for their enforcement were tricky. One can only
guess at the frustration of medieval jurists in search of a theory, a
cause, or a garment to clothe gifts. The authoritative Accursian
gloss was as laconic and unhelpful as any; it declared that promises
of gifts were "clothed 'with the aid of the law.' "18
As indicated earlier, one of Professor Dawson's goals is to show
the interaction between forced heirship and the legal treatment of
uncompensated promises, and he begins this demonstration in
earnest in his chapter on French law. The law of France, unlike that
of England, is marked by a standard feature of forced heirship, a set
of guarantees aiming to ensure that close relatives of every owner
will inherit a substantial predetermined share of his estate on his
death. Although the antecedents of this institution are obscure, they
are probably rooted in notions of family solidarity that date back to
rescripts in Justinian. Long before modern psychology taught of the
emotional ambivalence between parent and child, the institution of
the legitime concentrated attention on the blood relatives for whom
the decedent's personal attachment and sense of personal respon-
sibility ought to be strongest: his own children, their descendants,
his parents, and other ancestors in a direct line. This same concen-
tration is evident in the principles of forced heirship in Louisiana."
The purpose of the legitime-to prevent dissipation of family
resources-was also apparently a reason in France for strict public
records requirements that all inter vivos gifts be registered either
with a notary public or in the local court records where the donor
resided. According to Professor Dawson, the French public registra-
tion rules seemed so much in the natural order of things that they
were maintained in force throughout the Revolution and then
without debate preserved for the future by being securely lodged in
18. Id. at 26.
19. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1493-95.
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the Code civil. When, during the Revolution, it became clear that
there would be no wide dispersal of land ownership, the legislature
settled for a somewhat less ambitious goal also said to be in confor-
mity with natural order: limitation of the power of disposition to
donees beyond the immediate family. Professor Dawson's impatience
is evident in his account of French jurists' changed assumptions
about the natural order. If in nature there was no love more con-
stant or general than that of a father for his children, why was any
law needed to restrain dispositions to outsiders? Even more disturb-
ing, how could a natural order in one moment dictate equal owner-
ship by all and in the next moment the unequal ownership entailed
by keeping wealth in families through forced heirship? Apparently
no one asked. And French drafters also took for granted several
other rules, all of which Professor Dawson attacks. These included a
sweeping requirement of notarization, the donor's power to revoke a
gift for specified causes, and fictitious collation, the rule that all
gifts made by a decedent must be inventoried to determine if he ex-
ceeded the disposable quota..
To Professor Dawson, fictitious collation and reduction are
especially bothersome because they make all inter vivos gifts condi-
tional until the donor dies and his will is probated. Failure to state a
prescriptive period for fictitious collation has complicated the lives
of notaries and title examiners in Louisiana. Suspicions about a
title's merchantability arise whenever a gift appears in the chain
and the title examiner suspects that a forced heir might be lurking
somewhere. This suspicion usually impels him to advise clients to
disguise donations of land as simulated sales."0 According to Pro-
fessor Dawson, strict adherence to forced heirship produces many
curiosities in addition to fictitious collation. First, as a result of forced
heirship, parties are compelled to swear falsely and courts must
speak in baffling riddles. Second, French law defines a gift as a
transfer between patrimonies. Arbitrarily excluded from this defini-
tion are human services rendered and the mere use of physical
assets. This definition has puzzling corollaries familiar to tax
lawyers: a donee does not get a gift even when his father conveys
possession of land to him and authorizes the donee to collect fruit
and revenues from the land;2 renunciation of a forced share is a sur-
render of a right-it is not a gift unless donative intent can be clearly
shown;22 a beneficiary of a life insurance policy does not receive a
20. As the reader shall see, these disguised gifts also are targets of Professor
Dawson's relentless attack.
21. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 61.
22. Id. at 59.
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gift when his father, the insured, pays the premiums-even though
the purpose of the policy is to create a capital fund. 3
According to Professor Dawson, French notarization require-
ments for all inter vivos gifts were so strict that French lawyers
soon devised escape routes from them. Predictably, their first route
was through the don manuel or manual gift; there was no way to
stop a donor from physically giving an asset away. The other escape
route, according to Professor Dawson, was the disguised donation,
which he describes at various points as bizarre, cynical and trans-
parent because it embodies false recitals. In this reviewer's opinion,
Professor Dawson overreacts to the disguised donation. All legal
systems depend at times upon falsehoods and fictions; the French do
not have a monopoly on them. One reason Louisiana has the disguised
donation is that lesion rules bind parties to recite a true price, not
merely "one dollar and other valuable considerations," a recital so
typical of conveyances elsewhere in the United States. Even if there
were no forced heirship, lesion doctrine would make parties lie. 4
Before the enactment of the Louisiana trust code, simulations and
disguised donations25 were vehicles whereby an owner, seeking to
conceal his identity, could let a nominal title holder negotiate with
third parties, remitting proceeds to him at the conclusion of the
sale. Simulation, so long as it is not used to defeat revenue collec-
tors, creditors, and forced heirs, is a valid and useful device. As the
French do not have trusts, perhaps they were impelled to discover
the legitimate uses of simulation centuries ago.
The remainder of the chapter on France concerns other escape
routes from notarization requirements in addition to the manual gift
and the disguised donation. In Louisiana these are also well-
23. Id. at 62.
24. For four years from the date of a sale of an immovable, the vendee risks a suit
for rescission, "even ... [if] he [the vendor] had expressly . . . abandoned the right of
claiming such rescission, and declared that he gave to the purchaser the surplus of the
thing's value." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2589. A better obstacle to gifts of immovables could
hardly have been imagined. The Louisiana doctrine of lesion is sketched in Herman,
The Anomalous Institution of Lesion, 10 REV. GE.N. DE DROIT 192 (1979).
25. Professor Dawson uses the terms "disguised donation" and "simulation" inter-
changeably, but technically they are different transactions. In a simulation the
transferor, declaring that he intends a transfer, actually intends no transfer at all, and
the purported transferee gives him a counter letter acknowledging that the transferor
retains title. In a disguised donation, the parties intend a transfer, though not the one
declared in the act. Thus, in a disguised donation, the vendor declares he is making a
sale; but the derisory price indicates that he actually intends a donation. Ordinarily, in
a disguised donation, the transferee gives no counter letter because he actually ac-
qures title. See generally Lemann, Some Aspects of Simulation in France and Louis-
iana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 22 (1954); Comment, Disguised Donations, Donations Omnium
Bonorum, and the Public Records Doctrine, 51 TUL. L. REV. 288 (1977).
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travelled roads. Professor Dawson considers the function of natural
obligations, causa, and onerosity-the familiar trick of finding a
slight hint of self-gratification in a donor in order to convert a gift
into an exchange transaction, thereby saving it from nullity ordinarily
entailed by failure to follow notarization requirements.2" Unadulter-
ated generosity, Professor Dawson argues, must be exceedingly rare
when private profit is an organizing principle of society. And French
courts adulterate it when necessary; sometimes they find the donor
really acted out of a sense of natural obligation, not a spirit of pure
liberality. Often they find the donor expected a return benefit from
the donee, citing the donor's imposition of a condition or charge on
the gift. Here Professor Dawson's remarkable power as a case
reader is most apparent. To support his arguments, he has scoured
the French reports for a number of illustrative cases. The reader's
suspicions about Professor Dawson's attitude toward the French
treatment of gifts are quickly confirmed; under his withering pen,
French doctrines become targets of ridicule. For him, French judi-
cial diagnosis of natural obligations is haphazard, incoherent, and
arbitrary. The doctrine of cause has no meaningful functions:
[ilt has long been clear that the Code provision [French Civil
Code articles 1108, 1109] means nothing more than that a con-
tract should have a purpose. With this proposition it is very
hard to disagree; indeed, if a contract has no ascertainable pur-
pose the parties to it should probably not be left at large.27
Professor Dawson's treatment of causa, like his discussion of disguised
donations, is harsh. We sometimes consciously use ragged concepts
like cause28 because we want to discourage parties from testing
them at their boundaries. Cause provides a way of policing contracts
for fairness and legality, in much the same way as unconscionability,
another concededly ragged concept.2" Cause is also a handy peda-
26. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1523-24.
27. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 115.
28. The Louisiana State Law Institute's proposed "Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, Book III, Obligations Revision" reflects the ambivalence of the Louisiana
bar toward cause and consideration. Seeking the best of both worlds, the report
defines cause as
the reason why a party obligates himself. Nevertheless, a party may be obligated
by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise could induce
the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable
in so relying. Reliance on a promise made without required formalities is not
reasonable.
The proposed revision cites as sources of this definition Civil Code articles 1824 and
1896 and Restatement of Contracts Second § 90.
29. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1972 version). On the difficulties associated with the concept,
see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 485 (1967).
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gogical tool for analyzing gratuitous transactions. Unlike bargain
consideration, which presupposes a person can be bound only when
he acts in his own interest, cause is wide enough to permit open
acknowledgment that a party can mean to bind himself to perform
liberalities. Common law contracts texts make this last point in-
directly, with charitable subscription cases that torture the concept
of consideration. The point it is certainly made in equity where the
formal incidence of relief seems intentionally (diabolically?) unpre-
dictable. This reviewer's opinion, based on experience, not statistics,
is that the French enforcement of gifts is neither more nor less
haphazard than that of English law and equity combined. Professor
Dawson probably would not disagree with this assessment; German
law, more than French or Anglo-American Law, is his model of con-
sistency and logic. He admires the German treatment of gifts as in-
tensely as he dislikes the French.
Professor Dawson's treatment of the German law of gifts is in-
teresting chiefly because of what it teaches about judicial method
under a code. His chapter on German law is based on two assump-
tions about codification. First, a primary advantage of codification is
"that it forces the draftsmen to clarify the central store of essential
ideas and define both their limits and their numerous interconnec-
tions before projecting them forth and assigning them to work."'3
Second, the precision and care with which the interconnections are
contrived largely determine how much later users will invest in a
code to keep it intact. Thus, "when the primary source of most
private law is the condensed language of a comprehensive code, how
much effort should be spent . . . to maintain coherence and internal
consistency in the meanings attached to the code's vocabulary?" 1
According to Professor Dawson, the German drafters aimed to pro-
vide a single set of all-purpose texts to be consistently used
whenever the code itself applied. Since enactment of their code, Ger-
man jurists have made strenuous efforts to maintain its order and
internal cohesion. How have these efforts been manifested? They
are not apparent in the German forced heirship scheme which, as
Professor Dawson notes, is practically like that of the French Civil
Code. Nor do they appear in the definition of the kinds of assets
that can be given, for these also resemble the provisions of French
law. But the German code drafters, more than their French counter-
parts, avoided dangerous pitfalls. They minimized disruptive effects
of collation and reduction by attaching a ten-year prescriptive
period to supposedly closed transactions, a reform that Louisiana




might consider in current revision efforts."2 The German Civil Code
also simplified the procedure for retrieving unauthorized gifts by
restoring to the heir whose share was infringed the money value of
the assets, not the assets themselves. By requiring notarization only
for promises of gifts, it also minimized other doctrinal pitfalls en-
countered by the French. According to German Civil Code article
518(2), an unnotarized promise of gift is "cured" when it is per-
formed.3 Unfortunately, Professor Dawson fails to stress that Ger-
man leniency toward notarization expressed in article 518(2) is
severely modified by article 313, requiring notarial authentication
for transfers of land. ' To validate the promise of a gift of movables,
32. Louisiana Civil Code article 3542 apparently limits the time in which a forced
heir can force an outsider to return his ancestor's donation. But the Code is in-
conclusive on the period granted a forced heir to demand equalization of shares among
his co-heirs. Confusion among fictitious collation, actual collation, and reduction can
also complicate the search for prescriptive periods. In Successions of Webre, 247 La.
461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965), the court held that the ten year prescription of LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3544 applies to a demand for collation. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3544, a catch-all
provision, specifies a ten-year prescription for personal actions otherwise lacking a
prescriptive period. However, if before the ten-year prescriptive period runs, a succes-
sion is opened, administered, and closed and the heirs are put into possession, then the
collation action may no longer be available on the theory that there is no longer a suc-
cession to which collation can apply. Succession of McGeary, 220 La. 391, 56 So. 2d 727,
729 (1951); Successions of Scardino, 215 La. 472, 40 So. 2d 923 (1949); Doll v. Doll, 206
La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249 (1944); Mitcham v. Mitcham, 186 La. 641, 173 So. 132 (1937);
Prichard v. McCranie, 160 La. 605, 107 So. 461 (1926); Duffourc v. Duffourc, 154 La.
174, 97 So. 391 (1923). Thus, the heirs are estopped to demand collation, because they
would be forced to make a claim that they failed to make while the succession was
under administration.
There may be exceptions to this estoppel rule. First, the collation action may still
be available after a judgment of possession if there has been no partition. Commentary
states that "a previous judgment of possession should have no effect so long as the
succession was never previously partitioned." Comment, Some Aspects of Collation, 34
LA. L. REV. 782, 792 (1974). See Note, Successions- Collation-Prescription, 3 LA. L.
REV. 460, 461 (1941) (the proposition that the action for collation should persist so long
as the action for partition of the succession exists). This is the French view. Judgment
of 14 Nov. 1849, Cass. Civ., D.1849.1.286; 10 F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANCAIS, n* 590 (2d ed. 1876). Cf. 3 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ETA. WAHL, DES SUC-
CESSIONS reprinted in 8 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUPI ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL (2d ed. 1899) (suggests that collation should be prescriptible as any other
action). But see Comment, Collation in Louisiana. Part II, 27 TUL. L. REV. 232, 245
(1953). Second, if the judgment of possession is annulled on the basis of fraud or
another defect, collation may be provoked. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2001-6 (annul-
ment of the judgment of possession); 3393 (reopening of succession). The research for
this footnote was conducted by Mr. J. Lanier Yeates, and his assistance is gratefully
acknowledged.
33. According to German Civil Code article 518(2) "Any defect of form is cured by
the performance of the promise." BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGBI at 518 (I. For-
rester, S. Goren, & H. Ilgen, trans. 1975).
34. See BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 313 (I. Forrester, S. Goren, & H. II-
gen, trans. 1975).
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both French law and German law focus on execution: the former
emphasizes the manual feature of a gift and the latter focuses on
performance. 5 Furthermore, the false recital problems Professor
Dawson noted in French law also exist in German law. The German
Code more than adequately acknowledges it, as article 117 expressly
covers the effects of simulation. 8 Nonetheless, the more lenient
notarization requirements have produced positive effects. Confront-
ing the problem of "onerosity" in a gift, German courts, unlike their
French counterparts, have developed techniques for disentangling
the gift element from the exchange element and have given
remedies accordingly. By contrast, French courts, confronting the
issue of onerosity in a gift, have refused altogether to attempt
judicial surgery and have held fast to the conviction that the trans-
action is either a gift or an exchange, "never ... a Siamese twin...
headed for the surgical ward." 7 On the whole, however, German
courts, more than their French counterparts, have shown sensitivity
to the logic and consistency of their code and to the motives of
litigants. They are not as free as French courts "to read words in a
code in opposite ways, so that their meaning will ... depend on the
question . . . asked." 8 Their willingness to separate gift and ex-
change elements in a single transaction indicates they are more real-
istic about the bounds of altruism.
In the last chapter, "The Sources of Our Own Discontent," 9 Pro-
fessor Dawson returns to the general question raised in the preface:
Do we have something to learn from the treatment of gifts in
French and German law? His answer is no. "[O]ur disadvantages, the
main sources of our own discontent, are those of our own creation,
are not found elsewhere and cannot be removed by borrowings from
Europe."' 0 To reach this conclusion, Professor Dawson must navigate
across the channel and travel English roads, locating the time when
consideration first acquired a technical meaning in English law and
describing later stages when the functions of consideration were
made to proliferate. Along the way, Professor Dawson aims to dis-
credit Professor Gilmore's thesis that the law of contract did not
emerge until the nineteenth century and that consideration was a
revolutionary invention of Holmes.'1 Professor Dawson, if he is any-
35. See note 30, supra.
36. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 117(2) (1. Forrester, S. Goren, & H. II-
gen, trans. 1975): "If a legal transaction is hidden by a sham transaction, the provisions
applicable to the hidden legal transaction apply."
37. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 179.
38. Id. at 191.
39. Id. at 197.
40. Id. at 230.
41. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 19-21 (1974).
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thing, is a gradualist on the origins of consideration. There are no
easy explanations for complicated historical evolution, and the
evidence cannot be securely arranged in a neat pattern. In at least
two respects Professor Dawson's message is clear: consideration
doctrine emerged in the sixteenth century, much earlier than
Gilmore says, and it has virtues often ignored by proponents of its
abolition.
On the meaning and function of consideration Professor Dawson
is a purist. For him consideration is valuable chiefly for determining
if a contract was formed; the doctrine's core idea is that a sufficient
reason for enforcing a promise is its role in an agreed exchange to
enable each party to secure from the other an act or result that he
sought.'" For Professor Dawson, this essential idea has unfortunately
been overloaded with a number of superfluous functions such as the
reinforcement of offers, promotion of mutuality, and exclusion as an
element in an agreed exchange of any performance required by a
preexisting duty. Thus, to save the consideration doctrine for what
he deems its proper use, Professor Dawson must define the doctrine
narrowly. In the process he jettisons a lot of baggage now con-
sidered to be mainstream consideration doctrine.
If, in defining consideration, Professor Dawson aims for less
than the doctrine represents, in other respects he aims for too
much. This possible flaw may be illustrated by reference to an objec-
tionable aspect of French law: false recitals in disguised donations
and simulations. The common law counterpart to a false recital in
French law is an acknowledgment of nominal consideration. Accord-
ing to Professor Dawson, this minor form of simulation has crept into
American law. He points out that section 82 of the First Restate-
ment of Contracts approved simulation in the form of an acknowl-
edgment of a token payment, even when the payment was never
received.' Fortunately, in Professor Dawson's view, section 82 of the
Second Restatement abandoned such approval." But, as Professor
Dawson explains, token consideration persisted in the Second
Restatement in sections on option contracts. Section 89B of the Sec-
ond Restatement declares that such contracts are regularly upheld
against proof that the recited consideration was never paid. It
borders on utopianism to hope that parties will ever fully abandon
the protection afforded by false or vague recitals in their transac-
tions. For good or ill, people want to keep their business private.
Their quest for privacy does not always mean that they are seeking
to defraud tax collectors, creditors and forced heirs. To avoid arous-
42. J. DAWSON, supra note 2, at 221.
43. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 82 (1932).
44. The Second Restatement of Contracts omitted section 82.
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ing community resentment, some owners-oil companies, foreign
millionaires, and others-prefer to remain anonymous and to let
their nominees handle negotiations. If Louisiana sellers could recite
a true but vague price as "one dollar and other valuable considera-
tion" without running afoul of the lesion regulations, surely they
would.
A recurring theme of Professor Dawson's book is that the civil
law treatment of gifts is intimately tied to forced heirship. In
France, the connection manifests itself in a variety of troublesome
doctrines like onerosity and in bizarre institutions like the disguised
donation. This argument has merit in the sense that French lawyers,
spotting a disguised donation, might then try to discover heirs, but
the argument cannot be pushed too far. Take the case of Quebec, a
province with a French-style codification in all respects but one.
Quebec does not have forced heirship.'5 A cursory glance at a
treatise on the law of Quebec reveals every aspect of the French
treatment of gifts in full bloom-notarial authentication," gratuitous
and onerous cause,"7 the aberrational disguised donation, 8 and reduc-
tion and fictitious collation (called rapport).' One can only guess at
the reason for this state of affairs. A simple explanation is that an
heir, though he cannot demand anything from his de cujus as a forced
heir, can still inherit from the decedent on intestacy." Thus, he can-
not seek collation and reduction and set aside a disguised donation if
his ancestor purposely cut him off with a shilling, but he can seek
these remedies if he inherits ab intestat. Likewise, creditors can in-
voke the declaration of simulation and set aside disguised donations
without regard to forced heirs. Forced heirship, contrary arguments
notwithstanding, has not caused all our problems; its abolition will
not get rid of them. Perhaps the truth is that legal institutions are
not always rationally interrelated, contrary to what Professor
Dawson has argued so provocatively. They may be transplanted
from system to system when there is strong cultural and linguistic
affinity to assist the move. Because of this affinity, English law was
the parent of some American institutions. France has occupied the
45. QUEBEC CIV. CODE art. 831. History behind Quebec's position is discussed in
Dainow, Unrestricted Testation in Quebec, 10 TUL. L. REV. 401 (1936).
46. See QUEBEC CIv. CODE art. 776. The notary's role is discussed in G. BRIMRE,
LES LIBCRALITES 77-80 (1977).
47. G. BRIERE, supra note 46, at 32-37.
48. Id. at 100-03.
49. G. BRIPRE, LES SUCCESSIONS AB INTESTAT 148-165 (1977). QUEBEC CIV. CODE
art. 712-34. The reviewer is grateful to Gerald Lebovits, a Quebec lawyer, for the cita-
tions to Quebec law.
50. QUEBEC CIV. CODE arts. 598, 624a-35.
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same role for legal doctrines of many other nations. But this is a
story of heirship and lineage for another day. 1 This reviewer is con-
fident that when the story appears, Professor Dawson's superb
study will have a prominent place in it.
51. On legal transplants and their causes, see Watson, Legal Transplants and Law
Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. (1976); Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law,
37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Stein, Uses, Misuses-and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 198 (1977).
